The Experience of Imagery in Relation to Memory and Problem Solving by Welch, Melissa Kae
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1992 
The Experience of Imagery in Relation to Memory and Problem 
Solving 
Melissa Kae Welch 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Welch, Melissa Kae, "The Experience of Imagery in Relation to Memory and Problem Solving" (1992). 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625777. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-3a74-y860 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
THE EXPERIENCE OF IMAGERY IN RELATION 
TO MEMORY AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Psychology 
The College of William & Mary 
Williamsburg, Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Melissa K. Welch 
1992
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Author
Approved May 1992
Neill Watson
(P G~n
Peter L. Derks
Kelly G./Shaver
«TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES iv
ABSTRACT 2
INTRODUCTION 3
METHOD
STUDY 1 24
RESULTS 31
STUDY 2 32
RESULTS 34
DISCUSSION 37
REFERENCES 51
TABLES 60
APPENDICES 65
in
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Items Phrased in
Terms of Frequency and Degree 60
2. Factor Structure and Item Loadings for Memory Condition 61
3. Factor Structure and Item Loadings for Problem-solving 62
4. Factor Mean Scores for Memory as a
Function of Gender and Order 63
5. Factor Mean Scores for Problem-solving as a
Function of Gender and Order 64
iv
Imagery, memory, and
1
The Experience of Visual Imagery in 
Relation to Memory and Problem-solving 
Melissa K. Welch 
The College of William & Mary
Running head: IMAGERY, MEMORY, AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
Imagery, memory, and
2
Abstract
A phenomenological approach to understanding individuals’ experience of 
imagery when performing a memory and a problem-solving task was employed 
in an attempt to understand the complexity of individuals’ experience of 
imagery. In Study 1, 24 male and 24 female undergraduates performed either 
a paired-associate learning task or completed the Monster Problem and wrote 
descriptions concerning the experience of imagery associated with each task.
A questionnaire was developed using items obtained from these descriptions, 
and in Study 2, the questionnaire was administered to 51 female and 53 male 
undergraduate students. In a within-subjects design, each participant completed 
both tasks separated by at least five days. Order of task was counterbalanced 
across participants. Factor analyses were performed to determine the 
similarities and differences in the structure of imagery when experienced within 
a memory task as compared to a problem-solving task. Results indicated 
different factor structures for imagery depending upon the cognitive task. 
Implications for the development of self-report measures that possess greater 
construct and predictive validity than currently existing measures are discussed.
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The Experience of Visual Imagery in Relation to 
Memory and Problem-solving 
In past decades individuals such as Galton, Titchener, Wundt, Freud, 
and Piaget have speculated about the process and content of mental imagery. 
Yet, the study of mental imagery is a relative newcomer to the field of 
experimental psychology. Because imagery is a type of internal cognitive 
representation, it escapes direct observation and, therefore, poses complications 
for traditional experimental psychology. Fortunately, researchers are beginning 
to realize the necessity of developing new methods by which to study internal 
mediating events as directly as possible (Marks, 1985; Ward, 1985; Yuille, 
1985).
A broad definition of an image is a "perception in the absence of an 
external stimulus" (Gordon, 1972). The reporting of visual imagery appears to 
be a universal phenomenon (Gordon, 1972; Holt, 1972), but the study of 
imagery is constrained by the difficulty of introspection upon and 
communication of experiences of mental imagery. Gordon (1972) suggests that 
researchers have discovered only a few of the broadest qualities of imagery 
such as rigidity/flexibility, dimensionality, and vividness. Forisha (1978) 
concludes that one of the explanations for inconsistent and inconclusive
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relationships reported between imagery and abilities, such as creativity, is the 
failure of researchers to consider the complexity of imaginal processes. These 
assertions point to the need for a method by which to investigate the 
multidimensionality of conscious imaginal processes.
Most imagery research is characterized by procedures that include the 
completion of spatial tasks (Shepard & Cooper, 1982) and/or imagery ability 
measures (Kosslyn, 1975). Often these tasks are accompanied by self-report 
measures. Evidence suggests that spatial tasks, imagery ability measures, and 
self-report measures are measuring different phenomena. Forisha (1975) factor 
analyzed a battery of tests assessing verbal ability, spatial test performance, 
imagery ability performance, and self-report measures of vividness and control 
of imagery in children. Each type of measure loaded on a separate factor -- 
Verbal Ability, Spatial Ability, Imagery Ability and Self-report. Divesta, 
Ingersoll, & Sunshine (1971) discovered a similar pattern for adults. Ernest 
(1977) concludes that although self-ratings and spatial tests load separately, 
these self-report measures and spatial ability measures may not be completely 
unrelated. He contends that the assumption by researchers that a linear 
relationship exists among these abilities and the application of statistical tests 
that assume linearity may obscure existing nonlinear relationships.
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Alternatively, assumptions made by researchers as to the qualities of imagery 
that are worthy of empirical inquiry restrict the qualities of imagery that are 
presently investigated. These restrictions may lead to the development of self- 
report measures that fail to assess the multidimensional nature of imaginal 
experiences, further inhibiting the identification of relationships among self- 
report and performance measures.
It remains to be demonstrated that imagery is synonymous with spatial 
skill, and therefore, operationalizing imagery ability via spatial tasks is 
premature. The use of such narrow, idiosyncratic operational definitions of 
imagery will lead to an increasing number of uninterpretable results. Until 
evidence reveals a justification for combining self-report and performance 
measures, it must be assumed that subjective reports provide a unique source of 
information and are necessary to a complete understanding of the nature of 
imagery.
Researchers who include both self-report and behavioral observation 
measures often find a discrepancy between data obtained from observation and 
data obtained from self-report (Ernest, 1977; Forisha, 1975; Kaufmann, 1981; 
Suler & Rizziello, 1987). Such evidence seems to confirm the lack of validity 
of self-report measures and appears to support the advocates of observational
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methods who question the value of self-report measures (Kosslyn, 1980).
Close scrutiny of the procedures used in studies in which discrepancies 
between self-report and behavioral indices are obtained reveals that existing 
self-report measures may be used incorrectly. For example, Shaw (1985) used 
composite scores of two self-report measures, one developed to measure 
vividness and the other intended to measure control of movement. This 
combination of data without documented justification ignores the complexity of 
imaginal processes and inaccurately assesses the structure and function of 
mental imagery. As a result, any corroboration between behavioral and self- 
report data may have been obscured by this inadequate procedure.
Also, Suler and Rizziello (1987) combined scores for performance 
measures of spatial ability and self-report measures of vividness (as well as 
other questions assessing dimensions of imagery assumed by the experimenter 
to be important to the experience of imagery). Not surprisingly, the index of 
imagery ability derived from the combination of behavioral and self-report data 
failed to relate to behavioral indicators of creativity. Only when the single 
question assessing vividness of imagery was included in the analyses was a 
significant positive relationship found between vividness and creativity. These 
findings demonstrate that it is inappropriate at this point in the development of
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imagery research to combine self-report and behavioral data believed to be 
indicators of imaginal processing in order to produce one index of imagery 
ability.
Some researchers deny the usefulness of subjective reports of imagery 
to the understanding of imaginal processes (Kaufman, 1981, 1983; Neisser, 
1982) and point to the failure of self-report to provide information about 
underlying mechanisms associated with imagery (Richardson, 1985). Yuille 
(1985) emphasizes that often psychologists refrain from questioning the 
appropriateness of the experimental method in gaining an understanding of 
human behavior and experience, and that they refuse to acknowledge the 
complementarity of other empirical approaches to experimental methodology.
As Doob (1972) emphasizes, researchers who wish to study imagery 
must investigate images that are either reported by subjects or images that are 
inferred by the experimenter from observable motor responses in a task 
situation or inferred from physiological responses. Researchers who favor 
performance measures of imagery infer the underlying mechanisms based upon 
behavioral data. In the absence of this additional interpretation by the 
researcher, the objective data based upon performance measures is a 
description of the performance of the participant, whether or not the
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description is called explicitly a description of experience. The only difference 
between behavioral and self-report data is that behavioral observation in the 
form of performance measures provides a description of performance and data 
obtained from self-report data provide a description of experience, and neither 
of these procedures directly reveal underlying mechanisms for the 
phenomenon.
Working under the assumption that self-report measures can contribute 
in a meaningful way to the understanding of the experience of imagery, it is 
only necessary that individuals be aware of their conscious experience.
Instead of tying imagery to particular observational techniques or methods via 
task performance, it may be beneficial, as a first step, to begin with 
experiential data collected in different situations in order to gain an 
understanding of the structure, function, and process of imagery that most 
accurately reflects the experience of the individual.
At least three problems exist within imagery research that relate to the 
validity of self-report measures. These problems prohibit a fundamental 
understanding of the structure and function of imaginal processes. One, self- 
report measures of imagery have been developed based upon the 
presuppositions of experimenters who have made assumptions regarding the
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qualities of imagery worthy of empirical inquiry. Two, the procedure for 
establishing reliability and validity of currently used self-report measures is 
methodologically flawed. Three, the study of imagery needs to be removed 
from the context of memory in order to understand the complexity of the 
structure and function of imaginal processes.
The first fundamental problem within imagery research is that 
researchers have neglected to collect standardized anecdotal data on which to 
build a questionnaire of imagery that most directly reflects individuals’ 
experience. The failure to engage individuals more directly in the development 
of self-report measures may lead to the measurement of constructs that are 
unrelated or only moderately related to the internal experience of imagery. As 
a result, existing questionnaires may have been based on constructs that are 
unrelated to the internal experiences that mediate the behavior. Measuring 
imagery with scales of questionable validity could measure reliably a 
phenomenon that does not accurately reflect the concept of imagery as 
experienced by individuals.
Introspection in the study of imagery is emphasized by Richardson 
(1985) as being an essential part of understanding imagery. Richardson (1985) 
advocates the use of existing standardized questionnaires, however, as a means
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by which to obtain an accurate measure of the experience of imagery and 
argues that current self-report measures provide an adequate solution to the 
problem of describing experiential data in an acceptable and objective form. 
Given the inconsistent findings in studies that employed frequently used 
measures of imagery (see Ernest, 1977; Forisha, 1975; Kaufmann, 1981), the 
continued use of current standardized measures as a means by which to assess 
the experience of imagery should be questioned.
Alternative methodological approaches to investigating cognitive 
processes which begin at the level of human experience could help to verify the 
existence or qualities of internal events. To ensure the validity of findings 
related to mental imagery, a refined, systematic methodology is needed to 
investigate mental imagery as it is experienced by individuals. Hypothesized 
dimensions of imagery would then be validated by reports of human experience 
and dimensions not yet hypothesized by researchers would be identified 
through these reports. The constructs found to be internal mediators could 
then be transformed into a structured measure and studied in relationship to 
observable behavior. Such a methodology could contribute to a greater 
understanding of the use of imagery when performing cognitive tasks and the 
use of imagery in everyday life.
Imagery, memory, and
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A second problem in the measurement of imagery is proposed by 
Kaufman (1981, 1983) who argues that the reliability and validity of the Vivid 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1972, 1973) has been assessed 
inadequately. The VVIQ is a 16-item measure and is a shortened version of 
Betts’ (1909) Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery that measures imagery in 
seven sensory modalities. The VVIQ measures vividness of visual imagery by 
asking participants to rate four scenes on a 5-point scale according to the 
degree of vividness experienced two times, one time with eyes open, and the 
second time with eyes closed.
Although the VVIQ has been found to have high reliability within 
subjects, self-report measures do not correlate significantly with task 
performance in between-subject comparisons (Kaufmann, 1981, 1983). For 
example, introspective reports have been found to predict performance within 
subjects and between stimulus items, but not between subjects and within 
stimulus items (Marks, 1972; Sheehan, 1966; Sheehan & Neisser, 1969). One 
explanation for this pattern of results could be the implementation of a 
between-subjects design used to develop measures of subjective experience 
(Kaufmann, 1981, 1983). A person can judge if one stimulus item produces a 
more vivid image than another item, but he or she cannot make an absolute
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judgement about that experience (Richardson, 1980). Because an absolute 
criterion does not exist with which to compare one’s own imaginal experience, 
unsystematic errors occur in between-subject analyses. Individuals have had 
little experience in making ratings on a rating scale concerning their internal 
experiences and are likely to vary in the way they use a Likert scale to rate 
their subjective experience. This problem exists when any judgement is made 
using a Likert-type scale. Consequently, Kaufmann (1981, 1983) asserts that a 
within-subjects design would be most sensitive to demonstrating the validity 
and reliability of self-report measures as long as each individual is consistent in 
his/her usage of the scale. Kaufmann (1981) contends that as a result of this 
procedural flaw, researchers who use the VVIQ to assess the degree to which a 
score on the VVIQ is predictive of memory performance find positive results 
because of the artificially inflated reliability of the VVIQ instead of the 
accurate assessment of vividness that the scale is purported to measure. Other 
scales that have been developed using between-subject designs may be 
inadequate assessments of imagery as well.
Finally, a third problem in the study of imagery is that most of what is 
known about imagery has been learned within the context of memory task 
performance in which the question of interest has been: Does imagery
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facilitate recall performance? (Carrier, Karbo, Kindem, Legisa, & Newstrom, 
1983; Carigilia-Bull & Pressley, 1990; Guttentag, 1984; Leighbody Alsum, 
Tsao, & Evans, 1984; Marks, 1977; Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, & Deane, 1987). 
Particularly, the findings on imagery cited by Richardson (1985) include 
research investigating imagery within the context of memory or mnemonic 
instruction (Paivio, 1972; Paivio, Smythe, & Yuille, 1968; Paivio & Yuille, 
1969). By tying the process of imagery to memory tasks, studies focusing on 
memory fail to contribute to the understanding of the complexity of imagery.
Imagery must be examined in contexts other than that of memory task 
performance in order to understand the complexity of imaginal structures and 
processes. As Ahsen (1985) explains, an image is not synonymous with 
memory, but it is a symbolic representation of cognitive processing.
Associating imagery with memory to the extent that it is studied exclusively 
within a context of memory will lead to the confusion of imagery with 
memory. This association of imagery with memory will impede the 
understanding of imagery which is a process with its own properties (Ahsen, 
1985). Memory is viewed by Kaufmann (1985) as being encompassed by 
problem-solving, which is a more general cognitive activity. Kaufmann (1985) 
defines imagery as a type of symbolic representation and asserts that the center
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of cognition intersects at the joining of problem-solving and symbolic 
representation; therefore, studying imagery in problem-solving tasks could 
reveal complexities of a general cognitive processing mechanism that remain 
unrevealed in the study of imagery in relation to memory performance.
Imagery has been studied by a few researchers as a symbolic 
representation outside of the context of memory and has been found to be an 
important component of the creative process (Campos & Perez, 1989; Forisha, 
1978; Kaufmann, 1979, 1981; Khatena, 1978, 1983, 1984; Parrott & 
Strongman, 1985; Rhodes, 1981; Shaw, 1985; Shaw & DeMers, 1986; Shaw 
& DeMers, 1987; Suler & Rizziello, 1987; Torrence, 1972; Torrence & 
Khatena, 1969). In many of these studies, the processes of creativity and 
problem-solving were considered to be synonymous and the evaluation of these 
processes included a variety of divergent and convergent thinking tasks. Only 
two studies approximated an analysis of the structure and function of imagery 
as it relates to problem-solving. McCormick and Mouw (1983) tested Piaget’s 
theory of subsystem interaction in problem-solving with graduate and 
undergraduate students. A subsystems interaction is the interaction between the 
ability to reproduce static images of objects in a problem and the ability to 
anticipate transformations of that image. The results indicated that the ability
Imagery, memory, and
15
to produce static images and to anticipate image transformations accounted for 
a significant amount of variance in problem-solving ability, thereby revealing 
at least two properties of imaginal processes important to successful problem­
solving.
A second study by Cooper (1990) demonstrated that when observers are 
asked to solve spatial problems involving flat, disconnected projections, 
subjects constructed mental images consisting of integrated, three-dimensional 
objects instead of disconnected, flat objects. Evidence that subjects constructed 
an image with these qualities was inferred from the subjects’ superior 
recognition performance for three dimensional integrated objects presented after 
the problem-solving task which had never been seen before by the subjects.
Aside from these two investigations, the primary question of interest 
among most researchers has been: how can imagery facilitate creativity and 
problem-solving skills? This approach to the study of imagery indicates that 
the question of the nature of imagery is assumed to be adequately answered by 
previous research; however, it is necessary to discover the dimensions of 
imagery that best facilitate the type of reasoning required to solve a particular 
problem before attempting to foster problem-solving skills.
Current Measures of Visual Imagery
Imagery, memory, and
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Three questionnaires used frequently to assess imagery are the 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1972, 1973) discussed 
above, Sheehan’s (1967) modification of Bett’s (1909) Questionnaire upon 
Mental Imagery (QMI), and Gordon’s (1949) Test of Visual Imagery Control 
(TVIC). Sheehan (1967) based his questionnaire on the pool of 120 items 
from the Betts scale and generated a revised 35-item scale that assesses the 
extent to which individuals can voluntarily manipulate their mental images in 
each of seven sensory modalities. The questionnaire consists of items that 
measure control of imagery such as, "Can you see a man standing at the 
baseline of a tennis court about to make his first serve?" and "Can you see the 
same man in the same place but now dressed in red bathing trunks?"
Questions from Gordon’s TVIC require a "yes" or "no" response to 
questions which include: Can you see a car standing in front of a garden gate? 
What is its color? Try to see it in a different color. Can you see the car 
running along the road? Can you see it climb up a very steep hill? Can you see 
it get out of control and crash through a house?
That the W IQ  is an inadequate measure of imagery vividness has been 
argued by Kaufmann (1981, 1983). Kaufmann’s (1981, 1983) criticisms are 
based upon the previously discussed methodological flaws in the development
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of the VVIQ that may lead to artificially inflated reliability coefficients. 
Kaufmann’s (1981) criticisms have been rebutted, albeit superficially, by 
Marks (1983). In his rebuttal, Marks (1983) emphasizes that significant 
within-subject effects but nonsignificant between-subject effects obtained for 
the relationship between imagery ability and recall for pictures could be a 
function of the multimodality of the Betts QMI in that vividness ratings are 
required for seven sensory modalities. Marks (1983) points out that the studies 
in which these effects have been obtained presented only visual stimuli, thereby 
reducing the validity of the ratings. Also, Marks (1983) suggests that the 
meaningfulness of the visual stimulus could influence the extent to which 
individual participants are interested in or experience a particular affect as a 
result of viewing the stimulus. Tasks that present uninteresting visual stimuli 
such as geometric shapes may deflate the interest or affective value of the 
stimulus. This confound could eliminate between-subject effects for recall and 
vividness of imagery. Finally, Marks (1983) argues that the within-subjects 
effects may be a function of demand characteristics and that ratings of 
vividness should be obtained prior to the recall task instead of following the 
task. This procedure would minimize the extent to which participants’ 
successful performance on the task motivates them to provide high vividness
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ratings that they believe are expected by the researcher.
According to Kaufmann (1981, 1983), none of these arguments 
provides an adequate account for the pattern of results obtained using 
subjective vividness ratings. Instead, Kaufmann (1981) proposes that 
inappropriate designs used in the development of imagery scales may be 
contributing to the absence of between-subject effects in the relationship 
_ between vividness of imagery and recall performance.
Another debate exists among researchers as to the construct and 
predictive validity of the W IQ  (Charma, 1988; Marks, 1989a; Charma, 1989; 
Charma & Hamm, 1989). Marks (1989b) has compiled an extensive 
bibliography of the VVIQ that, according to Marks (1989a), provides strong 
evidence for the construct validity of the W IQ . Nevertheless, the fact that the 
VVIQ often fails to correlate with memory across a variety of recall and 
recognition tasks must be acknowledged (Dickel & Slack, 1983; Chara & 
Hamm, 1989; Cohn & Saslona, 1990).
Although this debate will undoubtedly continue, it seems that other 
qualities of imagery need to be considered when labeling individuals according 
to their imagery abilities. For example, a vivid, complex image may inhibit 
effective problem-solving, but a vivid, complex image may facilitate memory
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performance, or vice versa. In this case not only the vividness of the image 
but the complexity of that vivid image should be assessed. Marks (1972) has 
emphasized also that even "poor" visualizers (as defined by an obtained score 
on the VVIQ) have the potential to produce mental images and to use them 
effectively under certain conditions. Therefore, the goal of researchers should 
be to determine the qualities other than vividness that characterize imaginal 
processes in order to determine how these abilities interact with cognitive 
processing demands.
Research indicates that Gordon’s TVIC and the W IQ  correlate 
significantly with one another and confusion exists as to the construct these 
scales are measuring (Shaw & Demers, 1987; Ernest, 1977). The W IQ ,
QMI, and TVIC purport to measure unidimensional constructs, but evidence 
suggests that these measures may measure complex, multidimensional qualities 
of experience. Early factor analyses revealed that the dimensions of vividness 
and control load on the same factor in the study of imagery (see Richardson, 
1972), and Richardson (1969) provides evidence that vividness and control of 
movement of mental images covary in the mental practice of motor 
performance. Other researchers found an underlying multidimensional 
structure to the control of images, a construct that was previously believed to
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be unidimensional (White and Ashton, 1977). Factor analyses showed that 
control consisted of dimensions labeled Movement, Color, Stationary and 
Misfortune (the latter factor reflecting a negative event subjects were requested 
to imagine during the task). These findings reflect the complex nature of 
imagery and indicate a need to explore the dimensions of imagery using 
participant generated qualities of imagery instead of investigating preconceived, 
simplistic, experimenter generated dimensions of imagery measured by the 
available questionnaires.
Phenomenological Method
In the present research, phenomenological method was employed as a 
preliminary step in the development of a self-report measure of visual imagery. 
Phenomenological method provides a standardized procedure for obtaining 
reports of conscious experience. This information can serve as the basis for a 
questionnaire that assesses the experience of visual imagery and can be used to 
study visual imagery in relation to task performance.
Giorgi (1985) has delineated a phenomenological procedure by which to 
obtain descriptions of phenomena that most accurately reflect human 
experience. The phenomenological method used in the proposed research was 
a variation of the procedure explicated by Giorgi (1985). A brief description
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of the steps outlined by Giorgi (1985) is helpful in gaining a clearer 
understanding of the modification in procedure. The participant is asked to 
write a description of an experience. The request or instructions are asked by 
the experimenter in such a way as to make the least number of presuppositions 
about the phenomenon of interest as possible (Colaizzi, 1878). Therefore, the 
content of instructions or questions asked by the researcher range from general 
to specific.
After a description is obtained, the researcher reads the description for 
an intuitive feel for the gist (Giorgi, 1985). The protocol is broken down into 
meaning units. Then, the meaning units are grouped into individualized 
themes of meaning. This step involves taking the themes and transforming 
them into a psychological language. In this transformation, the details of 
situational context are omitted and a reflection of the individualized themes as 
the researcher perceives them are included.
These themes are combined into an individual description. This 
description is given to the participant and he/she is asked to modify the content 
of the description wherever necessary to best reflect the meaning of the 
experience as perceived by the individual. The researcher combines the 
individual descriptions of all subjects into one general description that centers
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around the elements that are common to all participants.
Variations on this procedure were employed in the present study. In 
the method outlined by Giorgi (1985) the individual description provides 
information that reflects the individual differences between subjects, but the 
general description reflects components of the experience that are common to 
everyone. For the purpose of the proposed research, results from the 
phenomenological analysis must reflect individual differences; therefore, the 
development of the individual description was the final step in the present 
procedure.
Phenomenological method is based upon Husserl’s (1925/1977) 
conception of meaning, and is concerned with the extent to which the resulting 
description accurately reflects the meaning of the phenomenon as experienced 
by the subject. In the present research, however, the description is related to a 
cognitive process that does not have meaning in the same way that experiences 
such as guilt, anxiety, and victimization have meaning. Consequently, instead 
of extracting themes of meaning from the individual descriptions, the 
researcher extracted phrases that conveyed information relevant to the 
experience of imagery and developed a more concise description from these 
items. Also, the participant judged the degree to which the description
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reflected accurately the phenomenal experience of the participant and made 
clarifications or changes in the description to best reflect his/her experience.
In addition to following the steps of phenomenological method as 
delineated by Giorgi (1985), a procedure based on Kelly’s (1955) theory of 
personal constructs was used to obtain information about the description from 
the participants’ perspective. Kelly (1955) assumes that individuals construe 
their world in terms of dichotomous constructs. Individuals are thought to 
perceive similarities and differences among significant others in relationship to 
a particular construct.
Participants followed a procedure based upon Kelly’s (1955) theory in 
which they compared their own descriptions to the descriptions of others within 
their own task condition. Participants told the experimenter how their 
description was similar to or different from the descriptions of other subjects to 
provide additional information about the experience of imagery from the 
participant’s point of view.
Hypotheses
The purpose of the present research was to use a variation of 
phenomenological method in order to obtain items that describe the structure 
and function of imagery as experienced by individuals when performing a
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memory or problem-solving task. These items, along with other self-report 
data derived from Kelly’s (1955) theory of personal constructs, provided the 
basis for a questionnaire assessing the conscious experience of imagery. In 
accordance with KaufmamTs (1981, 1983) suggestion, a within-subjects design 
was employed. It was expected that the structure of the experience of imagery 
would differ depending upon whether imagery was experienced within a 
memory or problem-solving context, and that this difference would contribute 
to two distinct factor structures of imagery for memory and problem-solving.
Study 1 
Method
Subjects
Participants were 24 males and 24 females fulfilling a research 
requirement for an introductory psychology course.
Procedure
Session 1. Participants attended two sessions. In session 1, participants 
performed either a memory task (Paivio, 1971) or a problem solving task 
(Hayes & Simon, 1974, 1977; Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985). The 
procedure for the memory task condition, was based on Paivio’s (1971) paired- 
associate learning paradigm. Twenty pairs of concrete nouns were presented to
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subjects on a screen using a slide projector at a rate of 10 seconds per noun­
pair (see Appendix A). After viewing all pairs, subjects were presented with 
14 of the 20 words and wrote the word they believed to be associated with the 
presented word.
Concrete nouns were used to maximize the spontaneous use of imagery. 
Although not all subjects spontaneously use imagery during memory tasks, 
subjects have been found to use imagery more often when remembering 
concrete nouns rather than abstract nouns and when free recall rather than 
serial recall is requested (Paivio, 1971). Therefore, the use of concrete nouns 
increased the probability that imagery was used while creating an unstructured 
environment in that the researcher did not provide a strategy for remembering 
the noun-pairs.
Immediately upon completion of the memory task, participants wrote a 
description of their internal experience of imagery during the memory task.
The following instructions were provided to the participants who completed the 
questions in a specified order. The instructions were arranged from general 
and unstructured to specific and structured in accordance with Colaizzi’s (1978) 
recommendation. This procedure minimized the extent to which a structure 
was imposed upon the participants’ experience.
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(Page 1) Please write a description of how you went about 
remembering the noun-pairs. (Page 2) If you used images in your head 
to complete the task, describe the qualities of the image itself and the 
way you used the images. (Page 3) If you used other strategies, such 
as verbal repetition, please describe the strategy, and indicate 
specifically how you used the strategy.
If participants reported having the experience of mental images, but failed to 
elaborate on the quality of the images, the researcher prompted the participant 
by asking, HCan you tell me about your images?"
After completing the description, the researcher identified the essential 
components of the description. A typical description written by a participant 
follows:
An association was formed between the two words and was represented 
as a visual image. The objects interacted together in some way. The 
images came to mind without conscious effort. Some depicted usual 
interactions but most would be unusual if found in everyday life. The 
images were similar to simple drawings, lacking in detail. The pictures 
were very clear and looked like crayon drawings in their simplicity and 
color.
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The following components were identified by the researcher: objects interacted 
together, produced without conscious effort, some usual interactions, most 
unusual interactions, similar to drawings, simple, lacking in detail, very clear, 
like crayon drawings, color. The researcher developed a description from the 
identified components. The final individual description based upon the 
elements listed above follows:
Your images were of objects which interacted together in some way. 
Some of the interactions were unusual but others were more usual 
interactions. Your images were clear and were produced without 
conscious effort. They were similar to crayon drawings, simple, lacked 
detail, and consisted of color.
The participant assessed the extent to which the description accurately reflected 
his/her experience of imagery during the memory task and, if necessary, 
modified the description to best reflect the participant’s experience of imagery.
In the problem-solving condition, participants solved the Monster 
Problem adapted from the Tower of Hanoi problems (Hayes & Simon, 1974, 
1977; Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985). The Monster Problem is 
unstructured with respect to processing style or strategy and can be solved by 
using verbal, written statements, or imaginal processes (see Appendix B).
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Participants were given 15 minutes to solve the problem. The mean time of 
completion is approximately 13-14 minutes (Kotovsky, Hayes, and Simon,
1985).
Upon completion of the Monster Problem, participants wrote a 
description of their experience of imagery or other processes they used to solve 
the problem according to the following instructions. Again, the directions 
were ordered from general to specific.
(Page 1) Please write a description of how you solved this problem. 
(Page 2) If you used images in your head to complete the task, 
describe the qualities of the image itself and the way you used the 
images. (Page 3) If you used other strategies such as words and 
sentences, describe specifically how you used them to solve the 
problem.
If participants reported having the experience of mental images, but 
failed to elaborate on the quality of the images, the researcher prompted the 
participant by asking, "Can you tell me about your images?" Then, the 
researcher identified the essential components of the description. A typical 
description obtained from participants is as follows:
As the problem was read, color images of objects in the problem were
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formed. But in order to set up the problem, complex images were 
abandoned including color and detailed images. Letters were drawn on 
paper to represent objects in the problem. Potential moves were 
visualized using mental images in which balls that were pictured as two 
dimensional objects were being transferred. Size of objects were 
remembered by position in the mental picture rather than proportionally 
sized objects. Transfers that took place within the images were similar 
to static before and after pictures with no actual movement being seen. 
Then the transfer was recorded onto paper using letters and arrows as a 
check on the feasibility of the transfers made using mental pictures.
The following components were identified by the researcher to be included in 
the questionnaire: color, complex images abandoned, two-dimensional, size of 
objects were remembered by location rather than proportionally sized objects, 
static before and after pictures. The description based upon the components 
listed above follows:
Your images were complex and consisted of detail and color. These 
complex images were abandoned as the task progressed. Objects in 
your images were two-dimensional and the relative sizes of objects was 
remembered by their location in your mental picture, rather than
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visualizing the objects true to their relative sizes. Movement in your 
images was represented by static, before and after pictures instead of 
visualizing moving objects within the image.
The participant assessed the degree to which the description accurately reflected 
his/her experience of imagery, and modified the description if necessary.
Specific questions related to vividness and control of imagery were 
asked last in the procedure to minimize the extent to which these questions may 
structure the subjects’ responses. To assess vividness, participants were asked 
if they were aware of the vividness of their images during the task. Control of 
images was assessed by asking subjects if they were aware of controlling or 
manipulating images in their heads. If vividness and control were reported to 
be part of the experience of imagery, they were included in the development of 
the imagery questionnaire.
Session 2. In order to encourage participants to make fine distinctions 
among different types of strategies or cognitive processes, the descriptions 
were labeled by two independent raters before session two according to one of 
three processing strategies: imaginal processing, verbal processing, or a 
combination of imaginal and verbal processing. Interrater reliability was 79 
percent. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion.
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Each subject read the descriptions of all three groups belonging to his 
or her own condition, either memory or problem-solving. Order of group 
presentation was counterbalanced. Then, subjects reported the ways in which 
the descriptions within each of the three categories were similar to and 
different from one another. The items obtained from the participants were 
included in the development of the imagery scale.
Results
In response to the first unstructured question concerning strategy, 
participants reported the use of all three categories of strategies, i.e., imagery, 
verbal, and a combination of imagery and verbal, during both memory and 
problem-solving tasks. Participants reported a total of 31 items that reflected 
their experience when performing the memory task and 15 items that described 
their experience during the problem-solving task (see appendix C). Except for 
one item, items obtained for the problem-solving task overlapped with the 
items obtained from participants in the memory condition. This item was, 
"Mental pictures of geometric shapes were used as symbols to represent lifelike 
objects".
Vividness was reported spontaneously by a few subjects, however, 
control of images was not spontaneously reported. Furthermore, participants
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failed to distinguish between control of images and movement within images in 
response to the structured question about control. This lack of distinction was 
indicated by the typical response to the control question that participants "made 
things move around".
Study 2 
Method
Subjects
Participants were 52 males and 51 females who were fulfilling a 
research requirement for an introductory psychology course and volunteers 
from an undergraduate statistics course in the department of psychology. 
Measures
Items obtained from the individual descriptions, similarity and 
difference items, and answers to the vividness question were transformed into a 
questionnaire. The wording of items in the questionnaire was as identical as 
possible to the wording used by participants when describing their experience 
of imagery. The phrasing of some items was changed to facilitate a clear 
understanding of the items. For example, "size of objects were remembered 
by position in the mental picture rather than proportional sizes" was changed 
to, "How often did you remember the relative sizes of objects by their location
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(i.e. left, middle, right) in your mental picture, rather than visualizing the 
objects true to their relative sizes?" Most items contained the same words used 
by the participants in describing their experience of imagery. Because 
students failed to distinguish between control of images and movement, only 
the item of movement was retained in the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
contained 46 items and responses were reported on a 1 to 7 scale (see 
Appendix C).
Order of items in the questionnaire was random. Some questions were 
phrased in two ways reflecting either a frequency or a qualitative assessment of 
the participants’ experience to determine if subjects made distinctions among 
these items in their experience. For example, item one concerning color was 
phrased, "How often do your images consist of color?". Item 12, which also 
assessed color, was worded, "To what degree do your images consist of 
color?". It was thought that the phrasing of these questions may reveal 
distinctions in the way participants relate their experience. Instead of deciding 
a priori to include only one phrasing, it was decided to obtain data from the 
participants as to the relationship between these two types of wordings in the 
subjective report of imagery.
Procedure
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The design was a within-subjects design in accordance with Kaufmann’s 
(1981, 1983) recommendation. Participants attended two 30- minute sessions 
during which they completed either a paired-associate learning task or solved 
the Monster Problem according to the instructions in Study 1. Ten to 20 
participants attended each session. Order of task was counterbalanced across 
subjects. Upon completion of each task, participants completed the 
questionnaire developed from Study 1. The sessions were separated by at least 
5 days to minimize carry over effects from the first task, and to minimize the 
extent to which participants would remember their previous responses and 
attempt to maintain consistency in responding to the questionnaire.
Results
Pearson product moment correlations were performed on items across 
both tasks to assess the relationship between items that had been phrased in two 
ways to reflect frequency of occurrence and quality of images. The results 
revealed that participants’ responses to these items were highly correlated (see 
Table 1), indicating that participants perceived these items to be asking the 
same question. Consequently, a mean score was calculated for each pair of 
questions and the means of these variables were included in the factor analyses.
Because of the high number of variables relative to number of subjects,
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a criterion for eliminating variables for the factor analysis was employed. 
Variables that were highly skewed and failed to discriminate among subjects as 
indicated by standard deviations less than 1.50 were not included in the final 
analyses. Also, two questions were discarded because of unclear phrasing 
which may have contributed to participants’ confusion about how to answer the 
questions, and four questions related to verbal processes were discarded. A 
total of 20 variables were retained.
Principal component analyses were performed to identify the number of 
factors to be specified for factor analyses. Results revealed three eigenvalues 
greater than 1.0 for the problem-solving condition and two eigenvalues greater 
than 1.0 for the memory condition using Kaiser’s (see Dillon & Goldstein, 
1984) method of factor extraction. These structures were confirmed by the 
examination of scree tests for each factor structure.
Principal axis factor analyses with oblique rotation were performed to 
determine the dimensions of imagery that are indicative of memory processes 
and one to determine the dimensions of imagery that are involved in problem­
solving. Oblique rotations were performed because this rotation technique 
allows variables to correlate freely, and therefore, the technique reflects the 
relationships among variables as they most likely exist in reality. Analyses
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revealed different structures for imagery depending upon whether imagery was 
used to perform a memory or problem-solving task (see Tables 2 and 3).
Items with a factor loading of .35 or greater was retained in the factor 
structure.
Order effects were examined using multivariate analyses of variance for 
both memory and problem-solving tasks (see Tables 4 and 5). A 2(Gender) x 
2(Order) multivariate analysis of variance performed for the memory task with 
Factor One and Factor Two as dependent variables revealed a Gender by Order 
interaction, F(2, 98)= 3.03, p < .053. Univariate analyses showed an effect 
for Factor One, F(l, 99) = 5.98, p < .016. Tukey mean comparisons 
indicated that if females performed the problem-solving task first, they 
obtained higher Factor One scores for memory than males, F(2, 101) = 5.04, 
p < .05. When females and males performed the memory task first, the 
difference between scores obtained on Factor One for males and females was 
nonsignificant.
A 2(Gender) x 2(Order) manova for problem-solving with factors one, 
two, and three as dependent variables showed a gender x order interaction,
F(3, 94) = 3.69, p < .015. Univariate analyses revealed an interaction for 
Factor One, F(l, 96) = 7.97, p < .006. Tukey mean comparisons indicated
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that females who completed the memory task first scored lower on Factor one 
than males who performed the memory task first, F(l, 99) = 18,65, g < .01. 
Also, females scored lower on Factor One when the memory task was 
performed first than when the problem-solving task was completed first, F(l, 
99) = 12.68, g < .01. Differences between males and females on Factor One 
when the problem-solving task was completed first were nonsignificant.
A main effect for gender was revealed, F(3, 94) = 6.05, g < .001. 
Univariate analyses showed that males scored higher on Factor Two than 
females, F(l, 96) = 6,83, g < .01. A main effect for order was found. 
Univariate analyses indicated that individuals who performed the problem­
solving task first obtained higher scores on Factor Three than participants who 
performed the memory task first, F(l, 96) = 7.02, g < 009.
Discussion
A three-factor structure best reflected the experience of imagery in a 
problem-solving task, whereas a two factor structure best described imagery as 
experienced during performance of a memory task. Within the memory task 
condition, the first factor reflected a complex structure that consisted of vivid, 
clear, three-dimensional images that were reported to facilitate effective 
thought about the task. The images were perceived to be real, colorful, and
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contained movement. These images were formed easily, were produced 
without conscious effort, and increased in clarity as the task progressed. A 
general label of Complex/Movement best describes the items which loaded 
onto the first factor for the memory task.
The second factor, labeled Simple, was characterized by simple, two- 
dimensional images that consisted of little context or background. Neither 
movement nor static images loaded on this factor.
Factor one of the problem-solving condition was characterized by 
complexity, vividness, and movement, and complex images were reported to 
facilitate effective thinking about the problem. More specifically, images 
contained a context or background, appeared real to the participants, and were 
three-dimensional. These items reflect a Complex/Movement factor, similar to 
the Complex/Movement factor of memory.
In contrast to the Complex/Movement factor, the second factor 
consisted of simple, two-dimensional, static images, and participants reported 
that they abandoned complex images formed earlier in the task in favor of 
simple images which they used to complete the task. A label of Simple/Static 
characterizes this second factor. Reports of complex images and three- 
dimensional images loaded negatively on this factor indicating further the
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simple nature of the images. The extent to which participants reported using 
images to perform the task obtained an equivalent factor loading for both 
Complex/Movement and Simple/Static factors.
A finding that perhaps contradicts intuitive speculation on the nature of 
images revealed that vividness loaded negatively on the Simple/Static factor.
At least when performing problem-solving tasks similar to the Monster 
Problem, simple, static images are not as vivid as complex images which 
contain movement.
Individuals experienced fuzzy images during problem-solving as 
indicated by the positive loading of this item on a third factor, whereas 
vividness and clarity loaded negatively on this factor. Other characteristics of 
this Fuzzy factor revealed that images were not formed easily and complex 
images were reported to inhibit effective thinking about the problem.
The factors discussed above reveal similarities between images that are 
produced during a performance of a memory task and images formed during 
problem-solving. Both experiences of imagery are characterized by a complex 
factor and a simple factor. Movement contributes to the complex factor for 
both memory and problem-solving tasks, and several other items are common 
to the complex factors for both experiences of imagery.
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Although similarities in the two factor structures for memory and 
problem-solving were obtained, differences between the two factor structures 
indicate that images produced within memory and problem-solving contexts 
may not be equivalent in structure and function. One obvious difference 
between the two structures is the addition of a third factor of fuzziness within 
the problem-solving task condition. Also, the fuzziness of images seems to 
interact with the complexity of images for the problem-solving task. For 
example, participants reported that complex images inhibited their ability to 
think effectively about the Monster Problem. Participants’ perceptions that 
complex images inhibited their ability to think about the problem was an 
indicator of the Fuzzy factor, suggesting that fuzzy, complex images were 
perceived to inhibit the problem-solving process; however, clear, complex 
images were reported to facilitate problem-solving. Reports of complex images 
that inhibited effective task performance failed to load on a factor at all for the 
memory condition. This finding suggests that level of complexity, whether 
vivid or fuzzy, does not lead to individual’s perception of disruption of the 
cognitive processes involved with memory, but the combination of complexity 
and fuzziness leads to reports of disruption in thought for problem-solving. 
Based upon this information, perhaps future researchers attempting to predict
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task performance would find that performance on problem-solving tasks is 
impeded by the generation of fuzzy, complex images, but that the fuzziness of 
images is not as important to performance on memory tasks, regardless of 
image complexity.
Another difference between the factor structures revealed that static 
images contributed to a Simple/Static factor structure for the problem-solving 
task, but static images failed to contribute to the Simple factor for the memory 
task. Also, images contained a context or background when experienced 
within a problem-solving task, but this item did not characterize images formed 
when performing a memory task.
Bizarre imagery loaded on the complex factor for both memory and 
problem-solving conditions. This result supports Paivio’s (1971) finding that 
bizarre imagery is useful when performing memory tasks. Most likely, the 
loading of bizarre images onto the factor structure for problem-solving was an 
artifact of the type of problem presented to the participants. Participants 
indicated in Study One that their images often consisted of monsters passing 
globes to one another until this strategy became too difficult to maintain; 
therefore, images containing representations of this type probably accounted for 
the loading of this item on the factor structure obtained for problem-solving.
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An important difference between the two experiences of imagery was 
revealed by the loading of "ease of constructing an image" on the complex 
factors of both memory and problem-solving, but the failure of this item to 
contribute to the Simple factor for memory. Based upon the present results, 
simpler images are not associated with easier production of the image, and a 
more complex image is easier to produce regardless of the task. This finding 
together with participants’ reports that complex images inhibit effective 
thinking while solving a problem provides insight into the difference between 
the ability to produce a complex image with ease and the dysfunctional nature 
of that same image depending upon the task demands. The image that is easily 
formed may not be the most functional image during cognitive processing.
This finding that an easily formed complex image may inhibit problem-solving 
is based upon participants’ perceptions of the degree to which complex images 
inhibit problem-solving; therefore, after this result is confirmed using another 
sample of participants, researchers should examine the extent to which 
participants’ perceptions of the relationship between easily formed, complex 
images and effective thinking about a task generalize to the prediction of task 
performance.
The results obtained for vividness and movement of images suggest that
Imagery, memory, and
43
vividness and movement are experienced within a broader context of complex 
images that are described as real, three-dimensional, and colorful. Vividness 
failed to contribute to the Simple factor of memory. During the memory task, 
movement was not associated with images that were void of context, simple, 
and two-dimensional. Within the problem-solving task, simple and static 
images loaded together, and neither vividness nor movement loaded on the 
Simple/Static factor. This pattern of loadings indicates that vividness and 
movement are co-occurring dimensions within a "complex” factor.
The vividness of movement within images is currently being 
investigated using the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (VMIQ), 
a scale developed by Marks and his colleagues (Isaac, Marks, & Russell,
1986); however, the VMIQ measures only the vividness and movement of 
imagery to the exclusion of other qualities of imagery that may interact in ways 
crucial to describing the complex experience of mental imagery. This 
speculation is supported by the present results that suggest both vividness and 
control may be included under a more general factor of complexity that 
includes vividness, movement, context, and three-dimensional images.
Generally, the present results provide support for the hypothesis that the 
experiences of imagery within a memory task condition and a problem-solving
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task condition differ qualitatively. After the present factor structure is 
confirmed using confirmatory analyses on data collected from another set of 
participants, the extent to which these dimensions are predictive of 
performance will be examined. Also, the present factor structure may 
generalize to other tasks similar in cognitive processing demands.
Although the factors obtained in the present study that distinguished 
among these two imagery experiences accounted for a significant amount of 
variability in participants’ experience, a large amount of variance remains 
unexplained. Some of this variability may be explained in terms of verbal 
strategies that participants reported in the present research. Verbal strategies 
such as talking to oneself, using short phrases and sentences to form 
meaningful relationships among objects were reported in the present research.
A combination of verbal and imaginal strategies were used by participants such 
as talking silently to oneself while trying to construct a mental image or 
beginning with a verbal strategy and switching to an imaginal strategy. Among 
those individuals who used a verbal strategy to encode information during the 
memory task, several reported the use of auditory imagery as indicated by item 
43 in the questionnaire.
Although these results contribute to an understanding of the different
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ways in which individuals solve problems and remember information, the 
purpose of the present research was to investigate the complex experience of 
imagery without constraining the responses given by the participants when 
conveying their experience, and therefore, participants were encouraged to 
describe all of the strategies they used, whether verbal or imaginal. Future 
researchers should seek other qualitative differences that account for the 
remaining amounts of variance related to additional components of the 
experience of imagery within memory and problem-solving tasks.
The present results were obtained using a within-subjects design as 
suggested by Kaufmann (1981, 1983); however, interpretation of the results 
may be constrained by order and gender effects that accompanied the within- 
subjects design. Order effects were obtained for the fuzzy factor of problem­
solving, as well as two gender by order interaction effects for the 
Complex/Movement factors of memory and problem-solving. A time-delay 
between the two sessions was included as a precaution against the tendency of 
participants' to maintain consistency between their responses in the two 
sessions, and order effects were controlled experimentally by counterbalancing 
tasks across participants. If researchers agree with Kaufmann’s (1981, 1983) 
argument that a within-subjects design is superior to a between-subjects design
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when measuring individuals’ self-reports of an internal experience using Likert- 
type scales, order effects that occur as a result of this design will have to be 
accounted for, or precautions in addition to those included in the present 
research will have to be taken to eliminate order effects. A possibility exists, 
however, that these effects may convey information that goes beyond a 
contribution to procedural refinement. Although order and gender effects 
obtained from one study may not generalize to other research findings, the 
experience of engaging in a problem-solving task may have implications in 
general for the type of cognitive mediators used to complete subsequent 
memory tasks. If a consistent pattern of order effects is obtained in future 
research, the cognitive processes that mediate these effects would be worthy of 
empirical inquiry.
Individual difference variables other than gender should be investigated 
in relation to imagery in future research to determine their effect on the 
qualitative experience of imagery. Individual differences in verbal and 
nonverbal ability could be expected to mediate the influence of task demand. 
Individual difference variables have been included in only a few investigations 
Parrot & Strongman, 1985; Kaufmann, 1981) and within these studies 
researchers failed to distinguish between nonverbal and verbal ability and a
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composite IQ score. According to Richardson (1977), individuals possess 
different cognitive style dimensions ranging on a continuum from being a 
verbalizer to being a visualizer, and he has developed a scale to assess these 
cognitive style dimensions. Furthermore, Kaufmann (1983) has emphasized 
the importance of including cognitive ability measures in the assessment of 
imagery. Given the lack of research on individual differences in cognitive 
ability in relation to the cognitive representation used to perform various tasks, 
it is important to measure these individual differences when comparing the 
experience of imagery in memory and problem-solving contexts to determine 
their effect on the experience of imagery.
Alternative methodologies that contribute to a deeper understanding and 
reflect the complexity of internal experience is essential to a complete 
assessment of the experience of imagery. Although phenomenological method 
has been used primarily within other contexts to assess the meaningfulness of 
experiences such as loneliness, anxiety, and self-deception, the present study 
demonstrated the usefulness of phenomenological method in identifying 
complex, multidimensional qualities of imagery. An empirical investigation of 
a phenomenon such as imagery should not originate with experimenter 
preconceptions as to the qualities of imagery that are most salient and
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important to individuals when engaging in various cognitive tasks. Only by 
asking individuals to introspect upon their experiences in a standardized 
manner can the complexity of imaginal processes be revealed.
The usefulness of self-reports on qualities of conscious experience to 
the prediction of performance depends on the accuracy with which these 
qualities are assessed, not on their ability to explain underlying causal 
mechanisms. It is not assumed, at least by the present authors, that self-report 
measures can explain by themselves the neural or cognitive mechanisms that 
mediate imagery; nevertheless, knowledge obtained about the conscious 
experience of imagery may provide clues as to the underlying mechanisms 
involved.
Individuals should be allowed to introspect upon their own imaginal 
experiences related to the performance of spatial ability tasks and imagery 
ability tasks and to convey their experiences by self-report in order to 
complement performance data. It seems that this procedure would be a more 
direct route of description than an imposition of the researcher’s interpretation 
of the behavior. Rather than proceeding under experimenter inferences alone, 
the subjective reporting of imaginal experiences may be at least as equally 
valid and a more direct method for the study of imagery. To the extent that
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self-report measures are developed using rigorous procedures for collecting 
qualitative data, appropriate methodological procedures, and the experiences 
are examined without the constraint of experimenter preconceptions, these 
measures may reflect the experiences of individuals more accurately. 
Questionnaires based on introspective data obtained using improved procedures 
may provide more valid self-report measures that correspond to performance 
measures.
A legitimate complaint regarding the limitations of current 
investigations of imagery lies within the restrictive nature of the laboratory 
setting itself. Yuille (1985) emphasizes that experimenters destroy the 
phenomenon under investigation by bringing it into the laboratory and placing 
situational restrictions in terms of specified tasks and artificial contexts that 
constrain the responses of participants. He asserts that the experimental 
environment isolates a phenomenon from its naturally occurring context and 
this disregard for the context of cognitive processing creates a situation in 
which "Both the experimenter and subject are victims of a shared belief system 
which permits hypothesis confirmation without knowledge generation" (Yuille, 
1985, p. 142).
Researchers need to venture outside of the laboratory and to understand
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the usefulness of imagery to everyday living, how imagery relates to memory 
for everyday events, to autobiographical memory, and to everyday reasoning. 
As Yuille (1985) emphasizes, the loss in precision will be worth the benefit of 
more meaningful, contextual research. Although the qualities of imagery as 
experienced in our everyday lives provides an important source of information 
concerning the experience of imagery, the laboratory environment provides a 
setting for obtaining knowledge of more formal cognitive processes such as 
analytical or logical reasoning in terms of syllogisms, or explicitly specified 
memory tasks. Consequently, neither source of inquiry should be excluded in 
favor of the other and improved self-report measures that reflect the 
complexity of human experience should be employed in the investigation of 
imagery regardless of the nature of the research setting.
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Table 1
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Items Phrased in Terms of Frequency and
Degree
Task
Item Memory Problem-solving
Color .74 .90
Complex/detail .81 .85
Clear .70 .61
Vivid .80 .84
Fuzzy .69 .75
Simple .73 .78
Bright .85 .82
Note: All correlations significant at p < .001.
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Table 2
Factor Structure and Item Loadings for Memory Condition
Factors
Item Complex/Movement Simple
Use images to perform task .84
Vivid .77
Clear .76
Ease of forming image .70
Image produced without conscious effort .59
Three-dimensional .56 -.44
Bizzare .55
Complex images facilitated effective thinking .55 -.62
Complex .54 -.68
Color .50
Images increased in clarity as task progressed .43
Real .38
Movement .36
Fuzzy -.39
Abandoned complex images for simple images .74
Simple .72
T wo-dimensional .33
Images consisted of context or background -.36
Eigenvalue 
% Variance
5.59
28.00
1.52
7.60
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Table 3
Factor Structure and Item Loadings for Problem-Solving Condition
Factors
Item Complex/Movement Simple/Static Fuzzy
Vivid .83 -.35
Complex .82 -.42
Complex images facilitated effective thinking .79
Images consisted of context or background .72 -.39
Real .71
Color .68
Three-dimensional .60 -.40
Clear .58 -.59
Images produced without conscious effort .56
Images increased in clarity as task progressed .55
Ease of forming image .47 -.46
Used images to perform task .45 .45
Movement .40
Bizarre .37
Simple -.35 .69
Static .60
T wo-dimensional .49
Abandoned complex images for simple images .41
Fuzzy .60
Complex images inhibited effective thinking .41
Eigenvalue 6.17 1.92 1.01
% Variance 30.90 9.60 5.10
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Table 4
Condition Factors
Complex/Movement Simple
Memory First
Male 4.81 4.62
Female 4.50 4.45
Problem First
Male 4.43 4.35
Female 5.04 4.55
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Table 5
Factor Mean Scores for Problem-Solving as a Function of Gender and Order
Condition Factors
Complex/Movement Simple Fuzzy
Memory First
Male 3.93 3.91 3.44
Female 2.67 3.68 3.50
Problem First
Male 3.60 4.21 3.73
Female 3.65 3.84 4.10
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Appendix A 
Noun-pairs
horse tree
star house
elephant gun
cup tongue
pipe gate
diamond bird
garden money
piano snake
watch radio
table dollar
clock pencil
spoon window
truck nut
hammer bottle
flat lion
arrow umbrella
apple flower
lobster cigar
bun shoe
skin butter
Imagery, memory, and
66
Appendix B 
The Monster Problem 
Three five-handed extra-terrestrial monsters were holding three crystal 
globes. Because of the quantum-mechanical peculiarities of their 
neighborhood, both monsters and globes come in exactly three sizes with no 
others permitted: small, medium, and large. The small monster was holding 
the large globe; the medium-sized monster was holding the small globe, and 
the large monster was holding the medium-sized globe. Since this situation 
offended their keenly developed sense of symmetry, they proceeded to transfer 
globes from one monster to another so that each monster would have a globe 
proportionate to its own size. Monster etiquette complicated the solution of the 
problem since it requires that:
1. Only one globe may be transferred at a time;
2. If a monster is holding two globes, only the larger of the two may be 
transferred;
3. A globe may not be transferred to a monster who is holding a larger globe.
By what sequence of transfers could the monsters have solved this problem?
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Appendix C 
Imagery Questionnaire
1. How often did your images consist of color?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. How similar were your images to a pencil sketch?
Not at all Somewhat similar Extremely similar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. How often did your images consist of isolated objects, without context or 
background?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. How often did you experience movement of objects in your mental images? 
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. How often were your images 2 dimensional?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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6. How often were your images realistic?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. How often were your images complex and detailed?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. How clear were your images?
Not at all Somewhat clear Extremely clear
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. How often did detailed, complex images inhibit thinking about the task 
(i.e.perhaps because they contained too much irrelevant information)?
Never inhibited Sometimes inhibited Always inhibited
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. How often did complex detailed images facilitate effective thinking about 
the task?
Never facilitated Sometimes facilitated Always facilitated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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11. How often did you abandon usage of complex, detailed images in favor of 
simpler images throughout the task?
Never abandoned Sometimes abandoned Always abandoned 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. To what degree were your images in color?
Not all Somewhat colorful Extremely colorful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. How often did your images consist of static pictures of separate objects? 
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. How often were your images static pictures of objects interacting in a way 
that only implied motion (i.e. one object acting upon or interacting with 
another in a still picture)?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. How similar were your images to a camera shot/snapshot?
Not at all Somewhat similar Extremely similar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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16. How often did your images contain a context or background?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. How similar was movement in your images to a panning effect (i.e. like 
an aerial scanning)?
Not at all Somewhat similar Extremely similar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. How often did your images contain unusual or bizarre interactions of 
objects that are not found in everyday life?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. How often did you experience vivid images?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. How similar were your images to the experience of watching television? 
Not at all Somewhat similar Extremely similar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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21. How often did you use conscious effort to intentionally develop a mental 
image?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. To what degree were your images complex and detailed?
Not at all Somewhat detailed Extremely detailed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. How often did your images resemble static, before and after pictures? 
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. How vivid were your images?
Not at all Somewhat vivid Extremely vivid
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. How often were your images 3 dimensional?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. How bright were your images?
Not at all Somewhat bright Extremely bright
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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27. How often did you talk silently to yourself in order to help you to 
perform the task?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. How often were your images easily formed?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. How often were your images simple and lacking in detail?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. How often were your images in black and white?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. How similar were your images to a crayon drawing?
Not at all Somewhat similar Extremely similar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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32. How often were your images a mental picture of the stimulus presented to 
you rather than original images?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. How often did your images consist of geometric shapes that were symbols 
to represent other objects?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. How often did you experience clear images?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. How often did you use images to help you to perform the task?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. To what degree did your images increase in clarity as the task progressed? 
Not at all Somewhat increased Extremely increased
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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37. How fuzzy were your images?
Not at all Somewhat fuzzy Extremely fuzzy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. How often did you form a conceptual relationship without making a 
sentence?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39. How often did you remember the relative sizes of objects by their location 
(i.e. left, middle, right) in your mental picture, rather than visualizing the 
objects true to their relative sizes?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40. How often did you experience bright images?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
41. How often did you use short phrases or sentences to form a meaningful 
relationship among objects?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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42. How often did you experience fuzzy images?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. How often did remembering how the word sounds when saying it to 
yourself (i.e. memory for an auditory sensation) help you to perform the task?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. How often did you talk silently to yourself while trying to construct a 
mental image?
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45. How often did you experience movement within your images during 
presentation of the task, but static images during performing the task.
Never Somewhat often Extremely often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46. To what degree were your images simple and lacking in detail?
Not at all Soroewhal simple Extremely simple
1 2 £  4 5 6 7
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